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House Price Keynesianism 
and the Contradictions of the Modern Investor Subject 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article conceptualises the marked downturn in UK house prices in the 2007-2009 
period in relation to longer-term processes of national economic restructuring centred 
on a new model of homeownership.  The structure of UK house prices has been 
impacted markedly by the Labour Government‟s efforts to ingrain a particular notion 
of financial literacy amid the move towards an increasingly asset-based system of 
welfare.  New model welfare recipients and new model homeowners have thereby 
been co-constituted in a manner consistent with a new UK growth regime of „house 
price Keynesianism‟.  However, the investor subjects who drive such growth are 
necessarily rendered uncertain as compared with the idealised image of Government 
policy because of their reliance on the credit-creating decisions of private financial 
institutions.  The recent steep decline in UK house prices is explained here as an 
epiphenomenon of the disruptive effect on the idealised image caused by the 
dependence of investor subjects on pricing dynamics not of their making. 
 
 
Key Words: UK house price collapse; house price Keynesianism; asset-based 
welfare; investor subjects; New Labour 
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Introduction 
 
There are many potential explanations of the sharp downward turn in house prices 
around the world as an effect of the global credit crunch.
*  
In the UK this was a 17-
month reversal of the previous price trajectory lasting until February 2009, with 
average prices falling 20.6% on the Nationwide House Price Index from a high of 
£186,044 to a low of £147,746.  It might be seen as a correction designed to 
counteract a temporary imbalance between the prevailing structure of house prices 
and their fundamental value (Shiller, 2008); as a reaction to the mistakes made by 
over-leveraged buyers on the expectation that house prices would continue to rise at 
their previous rate (Wolf, 2009); as the culmination of irresponsible mortgage lending 
on the misguided assumption that new financial instruments had eliminated credit risk 
(Best, 2010); or as the outcome of an extended period in which loose monetary policy 
provided banks with the option of creating credit at zero cost to themselves (Schwartz, 
2009).  All of these explanations quite clearly have something to be said for them, but 
even though they identify different culprits it is interesting to note that they share a 
common analytical starting point.  All attempt to explain the recent housing market 
collapse in terms of trouble being stored up in the structure of house prices due to the 
increasing fragility of the system of private housing finance. 
The aim of this article is to transcend the limits of this style of explanation 
by situating the UK housing market within a broader context of ongoing national 
economic restructuring.  The space in which private life is now conducted in the UK 
represents so much more than merely old-fashioned notions of „the home‟.  The 
dynamics of homeownership have become an integral feature of the Labour 
Government‟s attempts since 1997 to reconstitute the model welfare citizen 
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(Finlayson, 2009); an important means of routing the credit flows which sustain 
economic growth under a regime of „privatised Keynesianism‟ (Crouch, 2009); a 
primary indicator of the health of the financial system as commercial banking 
practices associated with mortgage lending have become increasingly blurred with 
investment banking practices (Soros, 2008); the site of many of the contradictions of 
financialised capitalism as the failure of investment banking practices rebound into 
the commercial banking sector (Langley, 2006); and the precursor to new forms of 
intervention undertaken by a state allegedly in retreat (Wigan, 2010).  In all of these 
ways ostensibly private dwellings have become quasi-public spaces positioned at the 
apex of political attempts to reproduce stable conditions suited to the expansion of 
wealth held privately within the economy. 
Presenting the core claims of the article in this way necessarily places the 
analysis at a high level of abstraction.  It is the emergent properties of a newly-
constituted but still merely tendential relationship between the model homeowner, the 
model welfare recipient and private financial institutions that is of most concern.  The 
argument is not that this relationship now dictates the content of everyday economic 
experiences for everyone in the UK, only that the trajectory of recent policy changes 
renders exposure to this relationship much more likely.  It is this more than anything 
else that makes the situation visible throughout 2007-2009 different to previous 
periods of falling house prices in the UK, thus invalidating those previous experiences 
as direct analogues of what has happened recently.  In the similarly-sized house prices 
falls of the late 1980s/early 1990s the reversal of the previous price trend affected 
only the-then dominant model of private homeownership as a symbol of a „property-
owning democracy‟ and the-then Conservative Government‟s reputation for 
governing competence in advocating that model.  In the more recent period the model 
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of homeownership as a mechanism for entering an „asset-holding society‟ has taken a 
hit, as has the Labour Government‟s reputation for governing competence in 
advocating that model.  In addition, the impact on the welfare state and on the 
profitability of banks‟ business models has also been noticeable this time around. 
The article proceeds in three stages in an attempt to draw out the distinctive 
features of the 2007-2009 house price reversal in the UK.  The first section enlists 
Michel Foucault‟s genealogy of modern liberalism to create an account of the abstract 
characteristics of the investor subject.  Foucault (2008) identified the highest stage of 
economic liberalism with the moment at which market rationality is engaged as the 
dominant motif of individual economic subjectivity.  The connection is then made to 
New Labour‟s financial literacy programme, which has been used to generate forms 
of investor calculation consistent with successful activities on private financial 
markets.  Section two moves the analysis from the microeconomic to the 
macroeconomic level.  It shows that the production of investor subjects displaying the 
attributes of Foucauldian market rationality was considered necessary as a means of 
stabilising the national growth model that emerged in the UK with the demise of post-
war Keynesianism.  The ensuing growth model has relied on the expansion of 
personal debt to such an extent that it makes sense to think of it as a form of privatised 
Keynesianism, but here it is described specifically as „house price Keynesianism‟ in 
an attempt to capture the importance of homeownership to the constitution of New 
Labour‟s investor subject.  The third section focuses on the role of credit-creating 
institutions as the crucial intermediary between the microeconomic aspirations of an 
asset-holding society and the macroeconomic requirements of a growth model of 
house price Keynesianism.  The concept of „emotional labour‟ (Hochschild, 1983) is 
used to analyse the specificities of selling credit within already saturated mortgage 
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markets in order to ensure that banks continued to benefit from rising house prices.  
The conclusion outlines the major implications for the move towards an asset-based 
system of welfare of the increasingly shared fortunes of the banking sector and the 
housing market within the context of such emotional labour. 
 
 
New Labour Welfare Policy, the Savings Habit and the Investor Subject 
 
Any discussion of the constitutive effects of government policy on the creation of 
investor subjects is necessarily abstract.  It depicts a process that will forever be in the 
making and which can never be complete when viewed in aggregate across the whole 
of society.  Alternative articulations of economic subjectivity will always be present, 
more so in some individuals than others, but at least latent in everyone due to the 
influence of prior socialisation practices (Martin, 2002).  The investor subject in the 
UK, for instance, will continually encounter the post-war welfare state subject in the 
struggle to impose a particular behavioural rationality on the self.  Paul Langley 
(2007: 78-85) has argued persuasively that the investor subject is existentially 
„uncertain‟ because of the ever-present need to contain impulses to act in altogether 
different ways.  The standard of empirical proof in the claims that follow in this 
section therefore lies only in being able to identify the dominant agential trends 
inferred by New Labour‟s programme of welfare reform.  This can consequently be 
used to animate a theoretically-informed account of the shifting balance of economic 
subjectivities amidst the championing of an asset-owning society, with a view to 
understanding more from that about the pressures that make the investor subject both 
provisional and fragile. 
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Understood abstractly, the aim of an asset-based system of welfare is to 
encourage individuals to act to shift the moment at which current income is consumed 
in order to create a steady flow of consumption possibilities throughout the life cycle 
(Finlayson, 2008: 96-8).  The consumption of current income is delayed when it is 
saved.  The idea is not so much to save in order to preserve the value of current 
income but to transpose savings into investments in order to enhance it.  If current 
income is invested successfully in assets whose value increases at a faster rate than 
consumer prices, the future income thus elicited is worth more to the investor in real 
terms than it was when it was earned. 
The dominant narrative in Government documents encouraging the 
individual‟s entry into an asset-owning society takes a clearly moralised form 
(Prabhakar, 2003; White, 2003).  The embrace of asset-based welfare is something 
that individuals should do and should also want to do, to reflect the duties they have 
to themselves to secure a comfortable future existence.  The moralisation of asset-
based welfare thus proceeds in much the same way as the prior moralisation of 
insurance.  Insurance spreads out income from the point in the life-cycle in which it is 
earned by protecting future income from the need to make replacement purchases in 
the event of a sudden loss of property.  The Treasury‟s presentation of its preferred 
system of asset-based welfare has very closely followed the insurance model.  
Individuals have been encouraged to provide coverage for themselves in the event of 
a future pensions‟ shortfall. 
The Pensions Commission‟s final report, for instance, recommended that 
“policy towards private pension saving needs to move beyond a purely voluntary 
approach” (2006: 14).  This was deemed to be due to inadequate knowledge amongst 
the UK population about what it will take for individuals to make good the future gap 
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in state insurance of consumption in later life.  The dominant inference – and 
therefore the frame through which Pensions Commission documents should be 
understood – is that patterns of behaviour consistent with the post-war welfare subject 
are ineffective as a response to the moralisation of private insurance of welfare in later 
life.  The requirement of behavioural change is thereby posited.  Treasury policy 
designed to foster greater financial literacy has been oriented towards the creation of 
“increased self-reliance in the long-term”, reminding people of their responsibility to 
act now in order to defend their interests in later life.  The assumption is that this will 
“enhance people‟s capacity to be more independent” and thus enable them to provide 
for themselves “a secure income throughout retirement” (HM Treasury, 2001a: 2, 6). 
The means adopted to secure the desired behavioural change has been to 
encourage the savings habit, particularly amongst low- and middle-income families.  
New Labour presented its savings programme in its first term in government as the 
route into an asset-owning society for people disadvantaged by their exclusion from 
inter-generational socialisation into budgeting for a rainy day.  Saving is necessarily a 
forward-thinking activity and, in the absence of inherited wealth, it is also the only 
means to accumulate assets.  As the Savings and Assets For All document stated (HM 
Treasury, 2001a: 9, 11): “the more regular and durable the saving habit of the 
individual is, the more likely they are at any one time to have built up a substantial 
stock of assets … with a view to maximising the benefits they enjoy from asset 
ownership”.  From this point on, Treasury interventions into everyday economic life 
in the UK routinely focused on efforts “to help those with the lowest levels of saving 
to make better informed decisions” (HM Treasury, 2001b: 3).  The Government‟s role 
as guarantor of the right to late-life well-being therefore increasingly revolved around 
“providing a significant component of relevant financial education, [… in order to …] 
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ensure that individuals are properly equipped to take the right decisions for 
themselves” (HM Treasury, 2001b: 29). 
However, acting upon a savings habit that previously was poorly formed – 
whether this means having it „developed‟ from scratch (HM Treasury/HM Customs 
and Revenue, 2008a: 38), „strengthened‟ (HM Treasury, 2003: 12) or merely 
„reinforced‟ (HM Treasury, 2001b: 13) – also involves a basic rethink of the 
individual‟s economic priorities.  The new priorities reflect new ways of 
conceptualising the self as an economic agent.  The always provisional nature of the 
investor subject (Langley, 2007) means that this conception of the self is usually 
unstable and never materialises in practical terms fully formed.  The Financial 
Inclusion Task Force (2008: 4), for instance, has stopped short of branding the 
Government‟s savings strategy a complete success until such time as larger numbers 
on savings pilot schemes have “pledged to change their behaviour” after having had 
the advantages of the savings habit demonstrated to them.  The Thoresen Report on 
Generic Financial Advice (2008: 7) came to the same conclusion about what counts 
as success.  It noted that the description should apply only once the Government‟s 
savings strategy has proved unequivocally that it is able “to change the way people 
engage with, and manage, their financial affairs”.  The standard of proof being 
demanded in these instances says much about the nature of the broader policy.  It 
implies that the objective of the move towards an asset-based system of welfare is, in 
the words of that system‟s foremost academic proponent, Michael Sherraden, to 
“change [people‟s] heads” (1991: 6).  Certainly, the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee‟s view of the overall strategy (2003: 4) is that its chief purpose is “to 
encourage people to build an asset up so that they can think about their future in a 
different way”. 
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„The future‟ is presented in all relevant Treasury documents of the period as a 
series of unknowns against which individuals should seek to secure themselves.  The 
Savings and Assets For All document endorses “the ideal model of saving … [as 
lying] … somewhere between a long term and a rainy day saver.  This would involve 
a strong commitment to saving for general rather than specific purposes, but with an 
acceptance that savings may need to be spent at some point in the future” (HM 
Treasury, 2001a: 10).  Such a model would provide for people “financial security for 
a rainy day … [plus] access to greater independence and long-term opportunity 
throughout their lives” via the inducement of “behavioural benefits in individuals, 
such as greater focus on the future” (HM Treasury, 2001b: 1; 2001a: 10).  The ability 
to engage in successful financial planning is treated as the equivalent of being able to 
“ensure that people can … cope with financial pressure”, in order to “protect against 
short-term variations in income and expenditure” (HM Treasury/HM Revenue and 
Customs, 2008b: 12; 2008a: 6). 
In all of this, „the future‟ is depicted as something to feel unsettled about, wary 
of, even fearful for.  The image of unavoidable forward-oriented financial anxieties is 
a repeated refrain in Government literature, as is that of the distress to follow if 
adequate pre-emptive arrangements have not been put in place to deal with their long-
term manifestations.  According to Michel Foucault (2008: 66), the creation of a 
deeply uncertain future is a standard feature of neoliberal governmentality: 
“individuals are conditioned to experience their situation, their life, their present, and 
their future as containing danger”.  The danger contained in not embracing the move 
towards an asset-based system of welfare is of leaving uninsured one‟s standard of 
living in later life in the event of continued state retreat from a transfer payment 
system of welfare.  As the Treasury has stated (2001b: 26), “While the costs of 
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making an informed decision to save may be great, a decision also has the potential to 
deliver significant benefits in terms of enhanced future consumption possibilities”. 
Instituting uneasiness about an unsecured future acts to incentivise, in 
Foucault‟s terms (1988), the government of the self by the self.  These are techniques 
through which individuals impose limits on their behaviour, deliberately constraining 
their own autonomy in the interests of forward-looking objectives.  It is about 
accepting the need for discipline and then constructing the means to enable the 
discipline to be internalised.  Financial self-discipline of the sort required to access an 
asset-owning society encourages a prudentialist outlook on present behaviour.  Pat 
O‟Malley (1996: 199) calls it a “privatized actuarialism” in an attempt to capture the 
sense in which the only individuals who will accumulate assets successfully are those 
who are able to internalise processes of risk management within the self.  Investment 
in financial markets – whether in commercial paper on the stock market or in bricks 
and mortar on the housing market – is the Labour Government‟s preferred self-
governing technique.  It is from these preferences that the encouragement of the 
investor subject arises. 
The investor subject fits Foucault‟s characterisation of the generalised 
economic subject to emerge under conditions of neoliberal governmentality.  This he 
describes (2008: 226) as a person who is “an entrepreneur of himself”.  The move 
towards an asset-based system of welfare involves the attempt to facilitate 
universalised manifestations of self-entrepreneurship.  All of the Treasury documents 
designed to promote the savings habit in the UK serve to validate the image of the 
entrepreneur within the actions of all future-oriented individuals.  The aim is to create 
an acting self where the subject of an asset-based system of welfare exhibits the 
personalised imprints of market rationality.  In other words, people must become so 
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attuned to that rationality that it is akin to forcibly inserting the market within the self.  
The remainder of the analysis focuses more specifically on the implications of the rise 
of the investor subject for the UK housing market. 
 
 
House Price Keynesianism and the Encouragement of the Investor Subject 
 
There is an important irony in the way in which the investor subject has been formed 
in the UK under New Labour.  With house prices rising on average by around 12% 
per year from Labour winning the 1997 General Election to the top of the market in 
2007, this far outstripped the average rate of inflation for the same period.  Real house 
price growth averaged almost 10% per year over that decade, making the housing 
market the ideal site for the accumulation of assets and for negotiating entry into an 
asset-owning society.  Yet, the development of the investor subject is supposed to be 
about learning behavioural characteristics consistent with what Foucault calls „the 
responsibilisation of the self‟ (see Miller and Rose, 2008).  From this perspective, 
individuals perform self-governing acts of restraint and control on recognition that it 
is their responsibility to shape the context in which their future conduct will occur.  
Seeking entry into an asset-owning society is all about successfully shaping future 
consumption possibilities.  However, the sharp downturn in UK house prices between 
October 2007 and February 2009 arguably revealed evidence of collective 
irresponsibility pervading housing market decisions. 
Towards the end of New Labour‟s first decade in power, there was an 
increasing tendency for buyers to over-leverage their housing stock purchases by 
taking out mortgage loans at or even above the prevailing price of the house.  Equally, 
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for every over-leveraged buyer willing to trust the continued trajectory of price 
increases to erode the real value of their mortgage debt there was a similarly over-
leveraged lender prepared to sell credit on exactly the same basis.  Although it is 
certainly easier to say so with the benefit of hindsight, none of this now looks like the 
prudentialism associated with the successful enactment of investor subjectivity.  
Indeed, it takes on the appearance of O‟Malley‟s privatised actuarialism gone terribly 
wrong, as attempts to internalise risk management within the self actually led to the 
production of systematic credit market risk.  The Government‟s efforts to 
responsibilise the self seem thereby to have inadvertently created mass housing 
market irresponsibility as UK house prices rose steeply in the mid 2000s. 
Looking back on this period, it now seems reasonably clear that the 
Government had ample opportunities to quell the over-heating of the housing market.  
In this instance there is more than merely hindsight to support such a claim.  The 
introduction of the Key Worker Living programme in 2006 was itself an 
acknowledgement that the increasing divergence between the increase in house prices 
and the increase in wages was squeezing many first time buyers out of the housing 
market.  Under the terms of that programme, public sector workers in socially 
significant employment qualified to have the state deliberately overturn market 
pricing signals on their behalf by meeting a proportion of their mortgage interest 
repayments (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006).  The fact 
that the Labour Government acknowledged the existence of accelerating affordability 
constraints but did nothing to intervene more systematically against the upward 
trajectory of house prices is the major policy story of this period.  The proportion of 
take-home pay required to service mortgage repayments in the UK housing market as 
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a whole shot up to a record high of 42% in 2007, rising from 25% in 2003 (Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 2007). 
The Government‟s stance on this issue could be said to have incentivised 
irresponsible rather than responsible homebuyer activity by making over-leveraged 
purchases the only means of access into its preferred asset-owning society for so 
many people.  The reason why lies in its concurrent pursuit of macroeconomic 
objectives that contradict the microeconomic goal of institutionalising fully 
responsibilised investment behaviour.  Recently constituted investor subjects can take 
advantage of slow but certain periods of asset price inflation to become more 
comfortable in their new economic identities.  However, New Labour chose to 
reproduce an underlying growth model for the UK economy which implied a very 
different process of asset price formation.  As before, such an argument can only be 
made in abstract terms, and it focuses on what followed in the UK after the demise of 
the Keynesian growth model. 
The nationally differentiated Keynesian growth model of the post-war period 
survived for as long as it did because it provided a temporary resolution to an inherent 
problem posed to all capitalist economies in the presence of democratic political 
institutions.  To achieve longevity, any growth model must be capable of reconciling 
capitalism‟s requirement for confident mass consumers with its tendency to disrupt 
the smooth reproduction of labour market stability through frequent moments of often 
quite brutal restructuring (Aglietta, 2001).  In the UK, the post-war Keynesian growth 
model did so through demand management processes activated via the transfer 
payments system of the welfare state.  Such payments provided protection for 
ordinary people from the oscillations normally associated with the business cycle, in 
turn allowing them to become the sort of confident mass consumers whose very 
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existence allowed firms to plan for expanded reproduction in the future (Jessop, 
2002).  The Foucauldian „fear of the future‟ was therefore mitigated for both 
individuals and firms in the same system of transfer payments. 
A virtuous circle ensued.  A combination of confident mass consumers and 
equally confident mass producers stimulated the sort of growth that prevented the 
transfer payments system from buckling under the demands being placed upon it.  
Successful delivery of growth was also necessary to prevent concerted democratic 
political mobilisation against capitalism as a whole in the face of pressures for 
restructuring.  All that was needed in cyclical downturns was for the government to 
call upon the state‟s capacity to issue debt in order to create forms of social policy that 
would sustain purchasing power and reproduce the confidence that in turn sustained 
the virtuous circle (Offe, 1985).  In other words, the state played the role of insurer of 
last resort of the consumption activity that gave the Keynesian growth model its 
inbuilt dynamism. 
Much has changed around the world since the heyday of the Keynesian growth 
model, but one thing has stayed noticeably the same in the UK.  Debt is every bit as 
much today the principal driver of the growth that protects the legitimacy of the 
capitalist economy, even if the source of that debt has shifted significantly from the 
state‟s former use of public debt to secure future consumption possibilities.  In the 
1990s, occurring simultaneously with attempts by many governments to placate 
financial markets by writing down public debt, there was a large expansion within 
those same markets of credit provision specifically aimed at low- and middle-income 
people (Montgomerie, 2007).  These new credit flows were activated concurrently 
with the development of a range of high-tech derivatives markets delivering specialist 
technical functions for professional bankers (Bellofiore & Halevi, 2009).  Financial 
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innovation was widely reputed at the time to have eliminated the threat of systemic 
risk, with newly traded instruments supposedly ensuring that the market price of all 
assets already fully reflected the prevailing balance of credit risk.  In this way 
financial innovation also presented private financial institutions with release from 
their Foucauldian fear of the future, allowing them to sell debt at market prices to 
ordinary people with ostensible impunity.  The accelerating private debt holdings that 
consequently arose then promoted the confident consumption which in turn drove 
economic growth. 
Colin Crouch (2009) has called this new growth model „privatised 
Keynesianism‟, but here the phrase „house price Keynesianism‟ is preferred in an 
effort to capture the principal route through which personal debt fed the dynamics of 
growth in the UK.  Crouch points to the way in which increasingly irresponsible bank 
lending was reconfigured as a public good as the new growth model hit its limits in 
the mid 2000s, and this was never more the case in the UK than with respect to the 
housing market.  The over-leveraging of homebuyers amid ever higher loan-to-value 
mortgages was the equivalent of banks giving reduced regard to the borrower‟s ability 
to repay the loan out of current income.  Instead, as yet unrealised capital gains from 
expected future house price rises played an increasingly prominent role in 
rationalising the unfolding structure of similarly over-leveraged mortgage lending in 
the UK.  The aggressive nature of this style of lending was tolerated as a public good 
for as long as house prices continued to rise, for this meant that the accumulated 
equity from the original purchase was sufficient to lessen the real burden of mortgage 
debt at the same time as sourcing new growth within the economy as a whole. 
House price dynamics take on an altogether new dimension when they are 
an essential component of the growth model of house price Keynesianism.  The 
 16 
decision to activate an investor subjectivity and to purchase assets on the housing 
market thereby becomes more than merely a means for the individual to access an 
asset-owning society.  It is also a means for the Government to reinvent the private 
space of the home as part of the public space of the national economy.  Potential 
contradictions abound when – as has recently happened in the UK – the mode of 
incorporating private housing stock into the national growth model works against the 
implied prudentialism of the idealised investor subject.  The normal workings of a 
speculatively motivated financial system offer precious few clues to the ordinary 
person of what, exactly, counts as prudential behaviour in any particular situation: to 
insist on the terms on offer or to temporarily withdraw from investment activity?  In 
this way the investor subject in the UK, always an existentially uncertain character in 
any case, has had those uncertainties magnified. 
 
 
Bank Business Models and the Enhancement of Investor Subject Uncertainty 
 
The tension inherent in any asset-based system of welfare is that individual 
savings have to be placed at the behest of potentially destructive price trends, where 
the conditions which make adverse price movements possible are themselves formed 
from individuals‟ savings activities.  The tension is significantly magnified in practice 
because those same conditions provide potentially lucrative opportunities for private 
financial institutions to exploit.  Credit creation activity within the mortgage lending 
market is the means of making profit from enhanced societal expectations that future 
welfare is linked to current homeowner status. 
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The mortgage lending strategies of banks helped the good times roll prior to 
the October 2007 price reversal, with easy credit enabling many homeowners to set 
their sights on much higher priced houses than would otherwise have been within the 
reach of someone on their income.  However, the actions of banks to facilitate over-
leveraged house purchases represents more than simply the aggregation of single 
decisions to under-price single mortgages.  UK financial regulators had tolerated high 
loan-to-value lending because this was compatible with the expanded reproduction of 
the growth model of house price Keynesianism (Crouch, 2009).  The cost recovery 
strategy to which banks were operating during the crucial 2004-2007 house price 
phase depended upon continually rolling over short-term obligations in credit 
markets, and their mortgage lending exposure meant that this in turn was dependent 
upon continued house price rises.  The cost recovery strategies of private financial 
institutions and the national growth model thereby became locked-in to one another. 
House of Commons Treasury Committee investigations (2008) have 
subsequently revealed evidence that the success of banks‟ business models came to 
rely less on guaranteeing repayments on each individual mortgage loan and more on 
attempting to flood the mortgage lending market with cheap credit in order to keep the 
whole loan structure afloat (see also Financial Services Authority, 2009).  Banks 
typically lend differently when their priorities change in such a way.  The specific 
structure of each loan will generally receive less rigorous oversight when their 
overriding objective is to ensure that general credit expansion facilitates inflationary 
pressures on asset prices.  In this way there will be no guarantee – and therefore less 
likelihood – that individual loans will meet minimum stress-test thresholds designed 
to protect the integrity of the loan book as a whole.  Due diligence in loan checking is 
unlikely to figure as prominently in banks‟ activities when they harness their role as 
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credit creators to their cost recovery interest in stimulating asset price inflation 
(Mason, 2009).  Indeed, such oversight would probably serve as an impediment to 
achieving their aims in such situations, because it would almost certainly lead to a less 
marked expansion in credit than when stress-testing of individual loans is suspended.  
Due diligence in mortgage lending was very definitely pushed onto the back burner in 
the 2004-2007 house price phase, as aggressive lending techniques took hold in order 
to achieve rapid turnover in mortgage sales (Walters, 2008). 
The specific way in which mortgages were sold in the period of accelerating 
affordability constraints also changed in order to reflect banks‟ new cost recovery 
priorities.  House of Commons Treasury Committee investigations (2009) remain 
ongoing on this point at the time of writing, but early indications suggest the 
increasing marginalisation of previous forms of expert labour within the mortgage 
lending market.  The model of expertise imprinted into the now old-fashioned image 
of the bank manager is one of a well-intentioned prudentialism enacted 
paternalistically on behalf of borrowers, only allowing individuals to take on loans 
that are well within their capacity to repay on time and in full.  Whether this is a 
romanticised conception or not, such an image is closely attuned to the needs of the 
equally idealised investor subject in Labour Government savings strategy documents.  
One way in which the investor subject might learn self-protecting behavioural traits of 
this nature is through witnessing at first hand the expert labour of the old-fashioned 
bank manager.  However, such experiences played little part in the normal process of 
selling mortgages in the run-up of UK house prices prior to 2007. 
The new realities of entering the mortgage lending market as a potential 
homebuyer can be depicted abstractly as the shift from exposure to the „expert labour‟ 
of the old-fashioned bank manager to exposure to the „emotional labour‟ of a new 
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cadre of mortgage professionals.  Emotional labour is Arlie Russell Hochschild‟s 
generic term (1983) for the transposition of elements of unwaged care work in the 
home into waged labour within the service economy.  Emotional labourers are 
required by the wage relation to act upon themselves in order to manage their feelings 
for the purpose of display (Mears and Finlay, 2005: 319).  The ultimate objective is to 
use their feelings to project a state of mind which a prospective customer can believe 
is within their reach if they purchase the product that the emotional labourer is 
attempting to sell.  For the customer to buy the product they first have to buy into the 
possibility of sharing the emotional labourer‟s managed feelings for the product. 
Understood abstractly, two separate exchanges thus take place.  At one level, 
the final product – in the case of the mortgage lending market the mortgage loan itself 
– is purchased using the credit facility which the person selling the loan is at liberty to 
extend on behalf of the bank.  At another level, however, this particular exchange can 
only take place if the personality of the emotional labourer – in the case of mortgage 
lending as embodied in the projected desire to become a homeowner – is structured 
into the overall deal.  On first glance this might look as though emotional labourers 
are required to put their feelings on sale as a means of facilitating the all-important 
purchase of the final commodity.  However, this is not necessarily so, because the 
personality which is exhibited as part of the final deal is very often an affectation that 
lasts for no longer than until the deal is signed (Hardt, 1999). 
The concept of emotional labour provides possible clues as to how so many 
people in the UK bound themselves between 2004 and 2007 to mortgage agreements 
that dramatically over-leveraged their borrowing.  The use-value produced by 
emotional labour is a specific form of subjectivity that is easily replicated by the 
onlooker (Abiala, 1999: 208).  If the customer is to be persuaded that a particular 
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mortgage loan represents a good deal for them, say, then the benefits of 
homeownership they can expect from taking on the loan must be reflected in the 
seller‟s enthusiasm for the deal when adopting the customer‟s perspective.  This is not 
the paternalistic prudentialism enacted by the old-fashioned bank manager as 
manifested in the tendency to say „no‟ to loan requests, but an undisguised excitement 
for the advantages that the borrower will receive from purchasing credit that the seller 
is only too eager to part with.  The excitement that the mortgage seller is able to affect 
for the house purchase that will be facilitated by agreeing to take on a loan remoulds 
the subjectivity of the person considering buying the house.  The object of the 
mortgage seller‟s labour is the potential homeowner, and in the process of emotional 
labouring the mortgage seller works on the subject of the potential homeowner in an 
attempt to realise that potentiality. 
Emotional labouring within the mortgage lending market therefore reinforces 
the stated aims of Labour Government savings policy by working on the people at its 
disposal in order to increase the likelihood that there will be more investor subjects to 
whom mortgage credit can be sold.  However, it does so in a complex and tension-
prone way.  In both instances affected feelings equating to vicariously projected fear 
of the future play an important role in creating the preferred outcome.  The major 
difference is one of distance, both physical and psychological.  The text of 
Government savings policy narrates the reason why people should be worried about 
leaving late-life consumption uninsured in a detached, third-person form.  It is an 
anonymous account of the difficulties that any person would face in maintaining 
current consumption patterns throughout retirement in the absence of an asset base to 
cash-in for that specific purpose (see, in particular, HM Treasury, 2003; 2007).  The 
vicariously projected fear of the future animating the emotional labour of mortgage 
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sellers is, by contrast, much more personalised, as is befitting the fact that the 
projection is a means of working on a particular subject.  It is presented to the person 
who is contemplating the purchase of mortgage credit through direct, face-to-face 
interaction and in an equally direct second-person form.  The fears that individual 
potential homeowners should have about failing to act on investor subjectivity can be 
lived out in front of them through the affected feelings of mortgage sellers.  Such 
fears can be multiplied by the latter‟s appeal to expertise in calling future price trends 
within both the mortgage lending and housing markets.  The person who is given a 
glimpse of this expertise in order to be told that mortgage credit will not be this cheap 
again and that affordability constraints will worsen as house prices continue to rise 
will be more likely to agree to loan terms there and then.  Early indications from 
House of Commons Treasury Committee investigations (2008; 2009) suggest that 
mortgage selling strategies of this nature were rife during the crucial 2004-2007 phase 
of house price increases. 
The investor subject of the contemporary UK housing market thereby has 
potentially contradictory sources.  On the one hand, the Labour Government‟s savings 
policy attempts to responsibilise homeowners, urging them to adopt self-governing 
techniques of prudentialism as a means of adaptation to an asset-based system of 
welfare.  Yet on the other hand, the successful enactment of emotional labour by 
mortgage sellers has been shown under post hoc examination to have led to 
increasingly irresponsible purchases of mortgage credit by supposedly responsibilised 
investor subjects.  Self-governing techniques remain the norm for investor subjects, 
but the dominant self-governing technique with respect to the UK housing market can 
hardly be said to have been one of prudentialism as house prices noticeably spiked 
between 2004 and 2007.  The fact that genuinely responsibilised investor subjects 
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were incompatible with the cost recovery needs of private financial institutions in this 
period is one important reason why.  Two very different articulations of fear of the 
future have competed for prominence in the constitution of the investor subject of the 
UK housing market: homeowners‟ fears of losing the wealth that they have striven to 
create through their savings strategies versus banks‟ fears of being unable to meet 
short-term cost recovery targets.  Given what is now known about the subsequent 
price trajectory following the autumn 2007 reversal, the evidence suggests that 
mortgage sellers‟ inducement of irresponsibilised investment activity generally won 
out over the Government‟s inducement of responsibilised investment activity.  
Moreover, New Labour appears to have been content to tolerate such a situation 
because it was conducive to the reproduction of banks‟ underlying business models as 
house prices rose rapidly, while this, in turn, helped to sustain the national growth 
model of house price Keynesianism. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The article has focused specifically on the UK case, but the lessons to be drawn from 
it have a broader applicability.  With the reconstruction of the banking sector still to 
take place fully following the recent credit crunch, the relationship discussed here 
between private financial institutions and the individual as both homeowner and 
welfare recipient will come under scrutiny in many countries.  In the UK, that 
relationship was situated more firmly than at any previous time in the context of the 
move towards an asset-based system of welfare.  The Treasury‟s financial literacy 
programme, coupled with related attempts to initiate investor subjects as a means of 
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facilitating that move, has strong supporters amongst international institutions such as 
the IMF and the OECD.  The appeal to those institutions of investment-oriented 
financial literacy lies in the expectation that functioning investor subjects will 
gradually reduce reliance on the state for future welfare provision and thereby ease 
pressure on future fiscal balance.  As the IMF and the OECD are important 
internationally as agents of policy transfer, New Labour‟s vision of an asset-owning 
society is likely to be advocated in other contexts as something to emulate. 
The implication of the preceding analysis is that intimations of best practice in 
the Labour Government‟s attempts to induce the move towards an asset-based system 
of welfare should be treated with caution.  At the very least, it is possible to show that 
there are clear points of tension built into the very foundations of New Labour‟s asset-
owning society.  The incorporation of individuals into the pricing dynamics enacted 
by private financial institutions does not go as far as to deny them agency under 
attempts to create such a society, but it does encroach on the particular type of 
agential autonomy that the prudentially-minded investor subject is supposed to 
exhibit.  Individual investor subjects have the choice of how to position themselves 
with respect to the housing market, say, in their efforts to accumulate assets.  Yet, the 
outcome of the accumulation strategy – and, by implication, the realisation of the 
vision of an asset-owning society – depends on the manifestation of house price 
trajectories over which no individual investor subject has any control. 
As recent circumstances have shown, the prevailing level of house prices in 
the UK is at least in part a reflection of pricing dynamics within credit markets, and 
authority in those markets is the sole preserve of private financial institutions.  
Nothing in the bank bailout packages introduced by the Labour Government in 2008 
in response to the credit crunch changes that fact (Watson, 2009).  This is of great 
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significance for the likely success of the move towards an asset-based system of 
welfare.  The continued delegation of price-making authority in credit markets to 
private financial institutions provides no buttress against adverse price movements 
that destroy accumulated personal wealth on housing markets and elsewhere.  The 
state is likely to receive increased calls for public protection of future income and 
public insurance of future consumption possibilities in such scenarios.  Yet, this 
applies even though the underlying logic of an asset-based system of welfare is 
consistent with state retreat from public activities of this nature.  As demonstrated by 
the impact on UK house prices of worldwide financial instability between 2007 and 
2009, the upshot of seeking behavioural realignments consistent with welfare self-
sufficiency can often be that a welfare system based on transfer payments is replaced 
in the name of an asset-owning society by emergency public insurance of private 
insurance of future welfare.  The political logic of the expediency of state retreat is 
thereby easily undermined when a growth model of house price Keynesianism co-
exists with attempts to institutionalise an asset-based system of welfare.  This finding 
should serve as a salutary lesson for other countries as well as the UK. 
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